The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted by Barkin, Eugene N.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 4 Article 4
1966
The Emergence of Correctional Law and the
Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted
Eugene N. Barkin
Federal Bureau of Prisons and George Washington University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Eugene N. Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 Neb. L. Rev. 669 (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol45/iss4/4
THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY:
A SYMPOSIUM ON PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL
LAW (PART III)
THE EMERGENCE OF CORRECTIONAL LAW AND THE
AWARENESs OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CoNVIcTED
EUGENE N. BARmE
THE FEDERAL WORK RELEASE PROGRAM
LAVENCE A. CARPENTER
STAFF AND CLIENT PARTICIPATION: A NEW
APPROACH TO CORRECTIONAL RESEARCH
3. DOUGLAS AND JOAN GRANT
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH
C=lE AND CORRECTIONS
FRANK LOVELAND
"Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more man's na-
ture runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. For as for the
first wrong, it doth but offend the law, but the revenge of that
wrong putteth the law out of office.m "
Francis Bacon
"We cannot tolerate an endless, self-defeating cycle of impris-
onment, release, and reimprisonment which fails to alter undesir-
able attitudes and behavior. We must find ways to help the first
offender avoid a continuing career of crime."
Lyndon B. Johnson
THE EMERGENCE OF CORRECTIONAL LAW AND THE
AWARENESS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED
Eugene N. Barkin*
I. THE EMERGING FIELD
The administration of criminal justice consists of four major
areas: the arrest and charge of the commission of the offense; the
trial and appeal; the disposition after a verdict of guilty; and fi-
nally the implementation of the judgment. Criminal law has tra-
ditionally been treated lightly by most law schools, practicing law-
yers, and even the bench. And the most neglected area of this
neglected field of law has related to the disposition of the offender's
case, i.e., sentencing and his rights thereafter.
The elimination of the waste of human resources is perhaps
the most significant task of the entire legal system devised for
regulating man's behavior in our present day complex society. It
is not even debatable that the whole machinery for maintaining
law and order can in large part be evaluated by whether or not
the sentence is appropriate and whether or not the judgment is
appropriately administered. Despite this, of all the potent forces
which could render effective service to this aspect of criminal
justice, the legal profession has for the most part in the past re-
mained silent. It is obvious that the lawyer, whose training, ex-
perience, and lifetime commitments grow out of the whole body of
law, has one of the primary responsibilities in the field of correc-
tions. The old concept that the role of counsel is completed when
the litigation has ended is as valid as would be the concept that a
surgeon should forget about his patient once the cutting and stitch-
ing has been completed. Likewise, a court which imposes terms of
imprisonment, not knowing what kind of treatment and facilities
await the defendant, is the same as a physician who prescribes
not knowing the makeup or consequences of the drug.
Recently, the courts have been in the forefront in recognizing
that the convicted are not shorn of all rights. As a consequence,
more and more they are interpreting the statutory and constitu-
tional requirements imposed on those officials who are charged
with the responsibility of supervising or caring for the convicted,
whether they be probation officers working in the community or
institutional officials charged with responsibility during incarcera-
tion. Cases involving the rights of prisoners, probationers and
parolees-a short time ago judicially ignored because the matters
* Legal Counsel, Federal Bureau of Prisons; Associate Professor of Law,
The George Washington University.
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complained of were regarded as being solely within the purview of
the administrators and not within the jurisdiction of the courts-
are now being heard on the merits. There is now a clear obligation
for the legal profession to keep abreast of this emerging field.
There is a continuing responsibility to advise, to guide and to lend
meaningful support in this phase of criminal justice both to the
inmate and to the administrator.
And such a role is appropriate. The very nature of the law-
yer's profession and training and experience, places him in the role
of a community leader. Thus, he frequently is concerned with the
problems of those who have gone astray, serving on parole boards,
youth and adult commissions and, of course, influencing legisla-
tion. His work is interwoven with almost every activity of the
correctional process, and if he is to fulfill its broad responsibilities
to society, those obligations must be shouldered. The administra-
tion of justice has only begun when the limelight of publicity at
the trial and appeal has been turned off and the convicted must
make his amends to society.
It is therefore important that the law schools shoulder their
obligation to prepare tomorrow's leaders by enlarging their crimi-
nal law courses beyond the traditional one year of criminal law.
The law schools should not limit themselves to common law rights
and wrongs and should include more than technical subjects such
as taxation, patents and the like. In today's world, yesterday's
curriculum is not enough. Fortunately, however, there have been
some recent signs of stirring, apparently from a new awareness of
the importance of sentencing and the correctional process.' There
are a myriad of research projects, federally and privately funded.
Some law schools are beginning to include in their curricula,
courses dealing with criminology, post conviction matters, law and
psychiatry, and the like. There is a greater rapport with the many
legal aid offices and some schools are working directly with penal
and correctional institutions.2
The awareness of the need has recently spread to some less
academic corners of the legal arena and has provided the impetus
1 Rubin, The Law Schools and the Law of Sentencing and Correctional
Treatment, 43 TExAs L. REV. 332 (1965).
2 The Federal Bureau of Prisons, in conjunction with five law schools
located near its institutions, has cooperated in starting legal aid projects
for its inmates. The services include civil as well as criminal matters.
It is felt that many times legal entanglements of a civil nature are
sources of difficulty which hamper the inmate's adjustment and pro-
gramming. It is expected that this program will be expanded to in-
clude more schools.
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for some concrete proposals for change on a national level. Bills
were introduced in both the Senate (S. 1288 by Senator Edward
Kennedy), and the House of Representatives (H. R. 6071 by Rep-
resentative Corman), which would establish an Academy of Crimi-
nal Justice to be an agency of the United States and to be located
at selected law schools. In addition to the regular law school cur-
riculum, specialized courses would be given Academy students cov-
ering, among other things, the biological, social, and economic con-
ditions generating delinquency and crime; the sentencing func-
tions; the administration of probation, parole and pardon; social
work; methods of rehabilitation and interrelated problems of law,
medicine, psychiatry, psychology, penology, and other areas rele-
vant to the administration of criminal justice.
Another institution outside the law school which is affirma-
tively encountering the problems of correctional law is the Ameri-
can Law Institute, whose draft of the Model Code of Criminal
Law devotes a portion to "Organization of Correction." The In-
stitute proposes to consider not only the law defining criminal be-
havior but also the law governing the treatment of criminals.
3
The courts, both state and federal, have demonstrated a new
interest in areas of sentencing and probation. The Judicial Con-
ference of the United States for instance has authorized the crea-
tion of a permanent committee to "make a broad study of the
federal probation system and to assume the additional responsibil-
ity for organizing and conducting the institutes and joint councils
of judges and others on sentencing in criminal cases." 4  Many
federal sentencing institutes have been held and the reports of
their proceedings are carried in the Federal Rules Decisions. Rec-
ognizing the need to understand what happens to the defendant,
the recent institutes are usually held near a federal correctional
institution to enable the judges to spend some time at those insti-
tutions and to allow the correctional authorities to demonstrate
procedures of classification, parole, and the like.
Although some correctional administrators may disagree with
me, I think, both as a lawyer and as one who works for a correc-
tional system, that this newfound interest of the leaders of the
bench and bar is all to the good. Too frequently the anti-authority
attitude of the offender has been nurtured by a realization that
often the law and those in charge of administering it have paid
little heed not only to prisoners' needs but indeed to their rights.
This new public concern, hopefully, should mitigate the difficult
3 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 301.1-06.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
4 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
672 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)
tasks of correctional workers in trying to turn some lives to pro-
ductivity and usefulness.
To speak in general terms of the way things are progressing
does not really explain what the field is about, what its presupposi-
tions are or what its place is in the area of criminal justice. I
should like, therefore, to discuss briefly a few specific illustrative
problems in this area, in the hope that some clarification of the
former discussion will result.
It should be kept in mind that I will deal generally with cases
decided by federal, rather than state courts. The necessity of con-
taining the discussion largely within the federal judicial system
arises not only from this writer's familiarity with the federal laws
and courts (and, correlatively, his lack of particular familiarity
with the variations inherent in state statutes), but also from the
fact that, as a general rule, the federal laws and procedures are
often readily adopted as guidelines by the several states in the
promulgation, invocation, and administration of their criminal and
correctional laws.
Although the treatment and rights of a convicted prisoner
are the paramount issue in correctional law, it should be briefly
noted that the problems which pervade this field arise and take
place in pre- as well as post-conviction settings. For example, the
inequities of the bail system are well recognized. Their reform to
the point where excessive bail and inequality of treatment are
abolished would benefit the rehabilitative process within an insti-
tution in that the resentment against the law or society that such
bail practices engender would be eliminated.5 Other pre-conviction
processes that must properly fall within the sphere of criminal
rather than correctional law also affect the post-conviction treat-
ment of offenders. It is not difficult to understand how the re-
sentment born of an unfair trial, a denial of counsel, a lengthy
pre-arraignment period, a coerced confession, or a disparate sen-
tence, can affect the entire fabric of the correctional law process.
Turning now to perhaps the primary problems of correctional
law as a distinct legal area, I should like to examine a number of
the more common problems which traditionally have been re-
garded as within the purview of the administrator. No matter
what may be the humanitarian procedure or conditions under
which one is committed, imprisonment necessarily entails a loss
of real freedom and a loss of rights enjoyed by a large majority of
our citizenry. However, while the loss of any unalienable rights in
5 The Congress recently recognized this with the enactment of the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3146-52 (1966).
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society at large is immediately labeled unconstitutional, the loss of
many rights in an institutional setting were at one time blithely
accepted as a necessary condition of discipline, security, or rehabili-
tation, albeit not legally required. But now the widely growing
concern for the rights of the accused is being reflected in a new
interest in the treatment of the convicted. No longer is he regarded
as the "slave of the state" as it was expressed by a court some
years ago. And the entrance of that concern has meant the
exit of the virtual immunity from judicial review of the adminis-
trator's regulations, decisions, and acts. While it is true that most
courts continue to pay lip service to the old doctrine that except in
extreme cases, the courts may not interfere with the conduct of a
prison, its regulations and their enforcement, or its discipline,
what constitutes a sufficient reason for a judicial review today is a
far cry from what it was just a few short years ago.
II. NEW CONCEPTS OF PRISONER RIGHTS
While lawful incarceration must necessarily withdraw or limit
many privileges and rights, 6 a prisoner should not be stripped of
any rights other than those which would be detrimental to the
administration and discipline of the institution or the program es-
tablished for him. And more and more the administrators are
being called upon to justify repressive measures.
A. CoRRESPONDENCE
Certain areas of administration have become especially sus-
ceptible to attack. One is the right of institutional officials to
intervene in certain types of correspondence. There is no question
but that prison authorities have the right to examine and censor
mail passing to or from the prison.7 It is just as clear, however,
that there can be no interference with an inmate's access to the
courts. To put it the way a federal judge in Philadelphia recently
expressed it: "For although prison mail may be censored, regula-
tions or restrictions that effectively preclude an inmate from com-
municating with courts cannot be tolerated." s Access to courts
must mean at least that the letter or the writ must be physically
6 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
7 Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940
(1955); United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553
(E.D. Ill. 1958), affd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
949 (1959).
8 United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
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delivered to the court.9 It is very important that these legal docu-
ments not only be forwarded, but that they be forwarded ex-
peditiously. I-think the need for expeditious handling can best be
demonstrated by two recent Supreme Court cases which were de-
cided on the same day. In the federal system a person must appeal
his conviction within ten days from the date of the judgment and
the Supreme Court has held that this ten day period is mandatory
and cannot be extended.' 0 In the first case the defendant had re-
tained a lawyer and the tenth day fell on a Saturday. On the
ninth day, Friday, the attorney who was to file the notice of appeal
left his office with a fever and went home to bed and stayed there
until Sunday. Thus the notice was not filed until Monday morning.
The Supreme Court held that notice was filed too late despite the
fact that there was a clear intention to file notice of appeal, that
the delay on the part of the attorney was unavoidable, that the
client had no control over when the notice of appeal would be filed,
and as a matter of fact apparently had no knowledge of the pos-
sibility that it would be filed late." On the very same day the
Court concluded that a prisoner's appeal was filed within the per-
missible time although the clerk received it fourteen days after
the sentencing. The decision is based upon the following evi-
dence: the date placed on the letter by the inmate, prompt for-
warding would have meant delivery within the allowable period,
there was evidence that mail at the time was not picked up every
day, and there was no way to prove that the date placed on the
letter was false.1 2 The Court reached these two diverse conclu-
sions despite the fact that in the first case the client was at least
as blameless as was the inmate in the second case. As a matter of
fact the proof showed that the inmate in the first case had
actually attempted to mail the appeal within the allotted time.
Incidentally one Justice was of the view that the prisoner's mail
box acts as the clerk of the court of appeals and therefore when a
document is put in the slot in the institution, it is received at the
court. This again is to be contrasted with rules pertaining to a
person in free society where it is necessary to get the required
document to the court within the specified time. The need to ex-
peditiously send or mail to the courts was underlined by a recent
court of appeals statement that mail to courts should not be delayed
longer than the time required to sort it and that even censorship
9 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
10 United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960); FED. R. Canvr. P. 37.
11 Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530 (1964).
12 Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964). See also Caylor v. United
States, 362 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1966).
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was not to be tolerated.'3
Handling correspondence with the prisoner's attorney has be-
come a source of great concern. It is now a common contention
that the prison authorities have no right to inspect mail passing
between the attorney and client, because this correspondence is
within the purview of the confidential attorney-client relationship
and inspection of this mail breaches this relationship. It should be
borne in mind that in order to come within the concept of this
relationship, the attorney must be rendering legal advice. The
mere fact that the correspondent is an attorney does not mean
that the requisite relationship has been established. As a practical
matter attorneys many times perform a variety of services for
their clients which do not involve legal advice. They are business
agents, public relations men, or just friends. It is most difficult
for the administrator to ascertain intelligently in what capacity
certain correspondence is carried on. But even where the attorney-
client relationship is established, it seems obvious to me that
the maintenance of the security of the institution requires that the
administrators retain the right to open and inspect incoming and
outgoing mail. Unfortunately, a small minority of the members of
the bar are not above reproach, but perhaps more important is
that it is a simple matter for anyone to have fictitious return ad-
dresses printed on envelopes or letterheads. If incoming corre-
spondence with false return addresses could never be inspected, the
consequences could be disastrous. At least one federal district
court held that letters between prisoners and their attorneys are
not exempt from inspection. 14 However, letters from attorneys
should be given priority insofar as forwarding them is concerned.
In a recent New York state case the court held that a warden
overreached his authority when he intercepted communications ad-
dressed to the prisoner's attorney without notifying counsel of
that fact.15 And, despite administrative rules commonly to the
contrary, the fact that the prisoner is making derogatory remarks
about the administration is no reason to refuse to allow him to
write to counsel. As a matter of fact this is precisely the situation
where access to counsel may be most important.16 The need for
the administrator to be free of any appearance of repression is
most important where he has some ostensible interest in disputing
13 Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966).
14 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959); see also Green v.
Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Me. 1953); United States ex rel. Vraniak
v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Il. 1958), affd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 949 (1959).
15 Brabson v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
16 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
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the validity of the inmate's complaint, since that situation affords
a reasonable basis for the accusation of interference with access to
counsel and the betrayal of the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship.17 Incidentally, the New York case also held that
communications addressed to public officers in the executive
branch of the federal and state governments, who are charged
with enforcing the laws, including the federal Civil Rights Act,
are in the nature of communications addressed to the courts them-
selves since these persons are officers of the court or public offi-
cers charged by the law with enforcing and administering the law.
Of course, letters to friends, business associates or anyone not
concerned with enforcement activities are not afforded the same
safeguards. In an old case involving the well-known Birdman of
Alcatraz, the inmate demanded an order restraining the warden
from unlawful interference with his business interests. 8 The
court held that the prisoner was not entitled to carry on business
affairs representing efforts to secure publication of a book or to
engage in general business correspondence with outside parties to
promote and further his interest. Just before Stroud died several
years ago, he renewed the same complaints in the District Court
for the Western District of Missouri stating that he wanted to have
his old bird book revised and republished, and also wanted to send
out a manuscript surreptitiously written some years before which
purported to describe the federal prison system up to some twenty-
five or thirty years previously. Stroud died before this case was
decided, but the court had indicated pretty clearly it was having
a good long hard look at Stroud's contentions and that it was
impressed with the fact that many great works were written in
prison. The court seemed to be of the opinion that unless the
prison administrators could show that the publication of these
writings would be detrimental to the security and administration
of the institution, it would be inclined to order them to allow
Stroud to attempt to have his manuscript published. After his
death the manuscript was turned over to the administrator by the
Bureau of Prisons.
A recent case' 9 decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit involves an inmate in the Minnesota State
17 The Federal Bureau of Prisons provides that mail to and from an attor-
ney may be inspected but that matters within such relationship "are
to be kept in strict confidence by the inspecting official." Bureau of
Prisons policy statement, Access to legal reference materials and legal
counsel and preparation of legal documents, Jan. 21, 1966.
'8 Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
19 Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1965).
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Prison. The inmate sought a declaratory judgment and an injunc-
tion against the warden's enforcement of certain mailing regula-
tions requiring the prisoner to make up a list of persons with
whom he wished to carry on correspondence, and subjecting all
letters to examination or censorship, with the exception that sealed
communications could be sent to the Governor, Attorney General,
Commissioner of Corrections and the warden.20  Under the au-
thority of these regulations, certain letters which the prisoner
had attempted to have sent out were returned to him by the prison
administrators. He claimed that he was entitled to maintain his
action under the Civil Rights Act alleging a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights and privileges. The district court granted the state's
motion to dismiss declaring that the restrictions involved could
not be held violative of any federal right either in their content,
application, or enforcement. This court reiterated the doctrine
that except in extreme cases, the court may not interfere with the
conduct of a prison, and of course this could mean that the in-
dividual cannot write to anybody he pleases. It mentioned certain
aspects of institutional treatment which would be within the pur-
view of judicial review. Procedures which are of such character or
consequence as to shock the general conscience, or which amount
to cruel and unusual punishment would constitute an unlawful
administration of a prison sentence. The court indicated an aware-
ness that the measurement of fundamental fairness is tied to
limits which a humane modern society imposes on the administra-
tion of penal systems.
The regulations involved in the Tahash case include no refer-
ence to a confidential relationship between attorney and client,
and the court made no comment upon this question. Among other
things, the inmate wrote through his attorney to the United States
Senator from California asking for a page of material; he wanted
to address inquiries to the Superintendent of Documents and
others about obtaining various statutory sections; and he wanted
to address a request to a federal district judge for legal service on
how to set aside a state court conviction in California. The prison
authorities said it would be appropriate to take up the matter
with the lawyer listed as his attorney of record, especially with
respect to copies of statutes and decisions.
The court held that under these circumstances, there is no
denial of rights secured him by federal law, and access to the
courts had in no way been denied him, as the filing of the suit in
the Minnesota court clearly indicated. The court also held that
20 These are not dissimilar to federal prison mail regulations.
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prison regulations are not required to provide prisoners with time,
correspondence privileges, materials or other facilities they desire
for the special purpose of trying to find some way of attacking a
presumptively valid judgment. In this case the several letters
were returned to the inmate including one that he wanted to
send to his attorney. He said that he should have an absolute
right to communicate with an attorney anytime he saw fit. The
court apparently looked at the letter to the attorney and concluded
that nothing contained in it was or could be claimed to be a mat-
ter of confidential communication. This opinion does seem to indi-
cate that a letter which is within the purview of the attorney-
client relationship would at least have to be forwarded, although
it need not be free of inspection.
There is authority and some reasonable basis for differentiation
between attorney-client correspondence and attorneys' visits with
their clients. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case
before it several years ago which arose from a New York jail
practice, held that normally wire tapping of conversations in a
penal institution is permissible for security reasons, but at the same
time, by way of dictum, the Court indicated that the confidential
attorney-client relationship must be respected.21 There Justice
Stewart did say "In prison, official surveillance had traditionally
been the order of the day." But he went on to state: "Though it
may be assumed that even in jail or perhaps especially there, the
relationships which the law has endowed with particularized con-
fidentiality must continue to receive unceasing protection, there
is no claimed violation of any special relationship here." The
Federal Bureau of Prisons does not subject attorneys' visits to audi-
tory supervision. Thus, those contending for sealed attorney-pris-
oner correspondence might well ask, "If you do not listen to attor-
neys' conversations, why must you open written correspondence?
Isn't it just as possible that improper material can be introduced
in the former case as in the latter?" r think the difference is one
of degree, rather than kind. It is feasible to reduce the possibilities
of introduction or removal of contraband in the visiting situation
because of visual supervision. Further, the visitor can at least be
identified as the attorney of record. One cannot even be certain
of that in written correspondence if the envelope may not be
opened.
B. LEGAL MATERIALS
Reasonable access to the courts logically includes permission
for the inmate to acquire certain legal documents or books, and a
21 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
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reasonable opportunity for him to study and prepare materials.
This is especially true where the inmate is not represented by
counsel. And this can still happen frequently because even in
the federal system the Criminal Justice Act 22 does not cover many
of these suits such as injunctions, mandamus, damage suits and the
like. I previously referred to the Baifleaux case23 in which the
court found that attorneys' mail to prisoners was subject to inspec-
tion. In that same case the district court found that the prisoners
were unduly hampered in their efforts to study law and prepare
legal documents. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
whether or not in a particular case access is reasonable depends
upon the surrounding circumstances of the case.24
The court reasoned that the restrictions on those in punitive
segregation are permissible because of the relatively short dura-
tion of the sanction, because it was imposed only for violation of
the rules, and because it was not imposed indiscriminately against
all inmates engaged in legal work. With respect to the general
population there had been a liberalization of time and facilities of
the library, so that there were no delays in excess of one day for
those wanting to use such facilities. Further there was a sub-
stantial effectual increase in the prison library, since although pris-
oners in segregation do not have access to the law library, they
are permitted to engage in legal research or preparation of legal
documents in their cells for about seven hours a day, seven days a
week.
Other prison rules upheld were that prisoners are not per-
mitted to purchase law books, and that books and materials must
be kept in the library. These rules are partly based upon the dif-
ficulty of examining incoming mail and packages for contraband.
Enclosures from a primary source such -as a publishing house re-
quired less scrutiny than if they were to come in secondhand. 25
This court held that it was not for the judiciary to decide whether
the regulations were salutary or achieved the purposes for which
22 18 U.S.C. 3006A (1964).
23 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
24 Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
-25 The Federal Bureau of. Prisons policy 'is to afford inmates reasonable
access to legal materials and a reasonable opportunity to prepare legal
papers. The inmates' program, however, is to continue without undue
disruption except where there are imninent deadlines. Those in seg-
regation are to be afforded the same opportunity as others. Those in
punitive status are not allowed to prepare legal documents unless faced
with a deadline, because of the short duration of this status. Bureau
of Prisons policy statement, Access to legal reference materials and
legal counsel and preparation of legal documents, Jan. 21, 1966.
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they were written. So long as the purpose is not to hamper in-
mates in gaining access to the courts, and so long as the rules do
not hamper them in fact, the court's inquiry is at an end. The
court went on to say that the state has no obligation to provide
library facilities and an opportunity for their use to enable an in-
mate to search for a legal loophole in the judgment or to perform
services which only a lawyer is trained to perform.
In a recent Pennsylvania case an inmate in Graterford Correc-
tional Institution also complained that he had been denied the use
of law books, and had been prevented from acquiring legal ma-
terials from sources other than the issuing court, the Government
Printing Office, and West Publishing Company. The Philadelphia
District Court followed Hatfield v. Bailleaux.26 That court pointed
out that the plaintiff had access to three sources of legal materials
and had been permitted to retain these materials in his cell while
he prepared his legal action. His right of communication with the
court had not been interfered with nor did he claim it had been.
There is no law library at the Graterford institution, and this
court also held that one was not necessary. Under these facts, the
court ruled that the plaintiff had not been denied his access to the
courts.27  However, even if there is no denial of rights on an in-
dividual basis to a particular inmate, if it is shown that the com-
plainant is given less access than other inmates, he has stated a
complaint which is cognizable under the federal constitution, i.e.,
the denial of equal protection under the law.
The prison administrators have traditionally fought any ac-
tivity which would place one inmate in the debt of another for
reasons which are obvious. Nothing could undermine the author-
ity of the officials quicker than to have the weaker or more igno-
rant prisoners beholden to their stronger or more knowledgeable
"colleagues." Consequently, an almost universal prison rule pro-
hibits one inmate from drafting legal pleadings for another. But
this rule was recently upset, probably because of the unusual fac-
tual situation giving rise to the suit.28  In this case, the court
found the petitioner had been kept in solitary confinement in a
state penitentiary for eleven months for the sole reason that he
violated this regulation. At the time he brought his suit such con-
finement continued and would continue for an indefinite period, to
be terminated only on the order of the Commissioner of Correc-
26 United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 13 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
27 The federal system provides the most relevant volumes of United States
Code Annotated. Policy statement, supra note 24.
28 Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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tions. The state moved to dismiss on the ground that the inmate
had not stated a cause of action. Thus, the facts alleged in the
petition had to be taken by the court as true. It did not point to
any reasonable alternatives available to the illiterate indigent in-
mates. The court pointed out that unless there is some reasonable
alternative a "jail house lawyer" is the only way the illiterate could
present his petition. Thus, if such prisoners cannot have the as-
sistance of "jail house lawyers," their valid constitutional claims
may never be heard, and as a consequence, the prison regulation
clearly conflicts with the statutory right of prisoners to petition
for the great writ. It issued an order to release the petitioner
from segregation into general population. This amounted to or-
dering the authorities to transfer the inmate from one part of the
institution to another, normally strictly an administrative func-
tion. The state is taking an appeal.
In another, even more recent case, a federal appeals court re-
manded to a district court with instructions to order prison officials
to release the plaintiff from the maximum security ward and allow
him to remain in general population as long as his conduct con-
forms to proper prison regulations. 29 In that case an inmate was
held in maximum security for four years, apparently because he
asked for religious services for himself and others of the Muslim
faith but refused, upon demand, to provide a list of others for
whom he spoke. Since maximum security status involved the loss
of certain privileges and loss of consideration for parole, the protes-
tations of the prison officials that this status was not punishment
was brushed aside by the court. The court held there was no
basis whatever for the imposition of this confinement especially
where "the assertedly offensive conduct bears so close a relation-
ship to first amendment freedoms."
These decisions are only indicative of the trend. It is now
clear that the administrator must run his institution as equitably
as possible with the retention of just those controls as are reason-
ably necessary for the proper administration of his institution.
If he does this, he may well avoid adverse and unduly restric-
tive judicial decisions. The recently promulgated Federal Bureau
of Prisons policy statement previously referred to in the foot-
notes, attempts to define rights of access to counsel and legal ma-
terials and tries to balance the individual's legal rights with his
program and security needs which -sometimes appear to clash
head-on. More important, I think that it contains the basic ele-
2 9 Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966). Petition for rehearing
was denied Aug. 28, 1966 and petition for writ of certiorari is being
prepared by the state attorney general's office.
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ments of fair play while enabling us to retain the basic restric-
tions that we feel are necessary.
The establishment of legal aid programs with the law schools
is a worthwhile program for all concerned, and can avoid adverse
judicial decisions and at the same time render more meaningful
service to the inmate. The efforts of the law students have gener-
ally been appreciated, and some tangible assistance has been given,
but perhaps more important, the program has had a salutary psy-
chological effect upon the inmates because for many it was the first
time an "outsider" took some real interest in their problems. The
law schools are most enthusiastic about the benefits derived by
their students.
C. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
Probably an even more difficult problem confronting the pri-
son administrator today is what to do about demands which are
being made upon them by comparatively small groups of inmates
because of the claimed requirements of their religious beliefs. At
the moment the litigation is pretty much centered upon the de-
mands of the sect known as the Black Muslims. This group de-
mands the right to be treated as a religion and from that flows the
right to hold religious services and to be provided a place to meet,
the right to certain diet, the right to have their own religious
leaders come into the institution to lead services and so on, ad
infinitum. Prison administrators have taken various views and
approaches and there have been numerous court decisions with
varied results. The typical administrators' approaches have been
(1) "We decided that the Black Muslims are not a religion and
they can't meet or receive any other treatment like a religion;"
or (2) "It may well be a religion, but even if it is, in view of
their background and teachings, if we give them what they want,
trouble will result;" or (3) "We'll give them everything which is
not disruptive to our institution."
The first approach, I think, is indefensible. Neither an ad-
ministrator, nor anyone else including the courts, is possessed with
such clairvoyance as to determine whether what a man professes
to believe in is or is not a religion. Consequently, a court is
virtually compelled to accept at face value the assertion that an
organization is a religion if it has the trappings of a religion even
though its activities are not exclusively religious.30 At a recent
conference for state wardens in the Midwest area I made a state-
ment to this effect. One man asked whether the American Nazis
30 Sostre v. McGinnes, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1964).
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or Ku Klux Klan would have to be regarded as a religion if it was
so asserted by inmates who are members of these groups. I ad-
vised them that I felt in view of the well-known background and
teachings of these organizations, a showing of practices and dogmas
sounding of religion would have to be made, but once made, unless
refuted, it would be difficult for the administrator to decide it
was not a religion.
If the complaint is made that an inmate has been deprived
of something or punished because of his religion, it is no answer to
merely assert that the matters complained of are administrative
decisions and not subject to review by the courts. An approach
close to this was taken in a case where an inmate alleged that he
was placed in solitary confinement because he insisted upon a par-
ticular translation of the Koran. The federal district court, after
considering "accredited social studies of Muslims, police reports
and reported Muslim difficulties elsewhere" dismissed the com-
plaint under authority of the "broad discretion" rule. The court
of appeals affirmed but the Supreme Court, taking the allegations
as true, as they must in a motion to dismiss, held that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action and that it was error to dismiss
the case.31
Of course, anyone has a right to believe anything he chooses.
But the guarantee of religious freedom is absolute only insofar as
it refers to religious belief. The state, the Congress, or officials
cannot interfere with religious beliefs, opinions or the conscience
of the individual. This rule applies within the confines of a prison.
The practice of religion, however, is not an absolute free-
dom. It is restricted whenever its expression is contrary to the
public good or whenever it presents a clear and present danger to
the safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. This is
demonstrated in Supreme Court cases involving activities of Je-
hovah's Witnesses,32 or conscientious objectors,33 or a Mormon prac-
ticing polygamy as an expression of his religious beliefs.34 The
situation prevailing in a penal institution is probably potentially
more explosive than in other settings. Thus the necessity of re-
stricting religious activities in prison, including the right to meet in
a group for religious services, has been upheld by several appellate
31 Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963) rev'd and remanded 378
U.S. 546 (1964). See also Walker v. Blaekwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.
1966).
32 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
34 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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courts. But these cases had been decided after a full hearing
where it was demonstrated just why granting the demands would
be detrimental to the administration or security of the institution.
Mere conclusory statements by the administrator are not enough.
The reasonableness of the conclusion must be factually established.
Evidence of the dangerous teachings of the group, past difficulties
with them in a prison setting, and the nature of the institution in-
volved are all relevant 5 A federal court of appeals put it this
way: "The problem . .. is not whether they should be permitted
to have congregational services, a minister, religious literature, but
rather, under what limitations protective of prison discipline they
should be permitted these rights."36 The federal system, after
having prevailed in several lawsuits brought by Muslims, 37 has
liberalized its policies. It has expanded the pastoral care available
to all inmates, especially those of denominational groups, which re-
quire care beyond the facilities of the system. In this connection
the administrators have taken an active role in seeking regular
visits by Black Muslim ministers, and consequently services38 are
being conducted regularly by these ministers in an increasing num-
ber of institutions. Another significant change is allowing an in-
mate to change his religious affiliation. Previously it was felt that
the prison environment was so unnatural and that such undue pres-
sures could be placed upon inmates to change religious affiliation
that it was best to compel an inmate to remain with his original
religious preference while serving his sentence. It is now felt
that administrators are not in a position to dictate what a man
should believe, if he demonstrates a sincere desire for the change.
To require him to remain with a religion which is not his choice
is indefensible.
D. MEDICAL CARE
The ability of inmates to cause their keepers to answer respon-
sively concerning charges of the inadequacy of the medical treat-
ment is a new area of litigation. Historically the courts have shied
away from hearing these cases on the merits on the ground that
what is appropriate is a matter for the administrators and the doc-
tors, and not the courts. 39  But even this previously untouchable
35 Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964); In re Fergu-
son, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417 (1961); Cooke v. Tramburg, 43 N.J.
514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964).
36 Sostre v. McGinnes, 334 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir. 1964).
37 Desmond v. Blackwell, 235 F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
38 Bureau of Prisons Policy Memorandum 7300.4, April 6, 1966.
39 Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965); Ex Parte Barnard, 52
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area is being delved into. In a case arising from an Illinois state
penitentiary brought in the federal court as a violation of the Civil
Rights Act, the prisoner claimed that he was receiving inadequate
treatment, was never examined by prison doctors, and had been
rebuked for abusing the privilege of sick call. The court held
that the prisoner stated a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 17
Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (1964), for intentional depriva-
tion of essential medical care,40 although it realized that the ma-
jority of cases would go the other way on the assumption that
taking jurisdiction would constitute an unwarranted intrusion
into the internal discipline of the state and penal institutions. Very
recently a suit was brought by a prisoner in a Maryland institution
to enjoin the prison authorities from refusing to administer ap-
propriate medical and surgical treatment. The relief was sum-
marily denied, but the court of appeals held that the allegations,
since not denied, must be taken as true, and if he was not receiving
appropriate medical attention, the prisoner did state a cause of ac-
tion. Therefore, a full scale hearing on this complaint was or-
dered.41 Subsequently one operation was performed, and at the
hearing there was a dispute as to the feasibility of the second, five
doctors testifying that the risk was high and the prognosis poor
for another operation. Nonetheless the court appointed a prostho-
dontist for his diagnosis. At this writing no decision has been
made by the trial court. The amazing aspect of this case is not
the remand but the abundance of caution exercised by the trial
court after the remand. It seems to me that the testimony elicited
before it clearly indicated that the refusal of the administrators to
allow a second operation was not arbitrary or capricious and that
the right to judicial intervention had terminated.
In another suit the plaintiff sued various physicians and ad-
ministrators individually seeking to proceed in forma pauperis 42
although no facts were proved to show any defendant responsible
for the acts of alleged misconduct. The court refused to permit
the action to be filed but required the state to make available all
records which would show which persons made the decisions of
which the plaintiff complained. It also approved the original suit
filed and any suit against officials as individuals who were in-
volved. 43
F. Supp. 102 (E.D. IlM. 1943); Jones v. Pescor, 169 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1948).
40 Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
41 Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
43 Hirons v. Maryland, Civil No. 17193, D. Md., denied Aug. 19, 1966.
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E. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
In another case of first impression, in an action brought for
violation of an inmate's civil rights, 44 the federal court ruled that
the conditions under which an inmate was confined in "strip cells"
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and enjoined the state
authorities from confining him in such conditions. 45 It did not
preclude the use of such cells under more favorable conditions.
The court was virtually revolted by the conditions under which
this inmate was forced to live and outlined the conditions in great
detail. Again, like the Tennessee case, the grim facts resulted in a
new inroad into the administrator's prerogatives. 4
F. THE RIGHT TO SUE FOR INJURIES
Several years ago the Supreme Court of the United States
struck another blow for the proposition that the rights of persons
serving prison sentences should, as much as possible, approximate
the rights of persons at liberty. The federal government in the
Federal Tort Claims Act stripped itself of sovereign immunity
where citizens were injured through the neglect of the government
agents, but certain exceptions were spelled out in the legislation.47
For a number of years it was practically hornbook law that a
prisoner could not sue the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for injuries sustained during the confinement in a
federal prison regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
injury.48 Eventually, however, the court of appeals for the second
circuit, in two en banc five to four rulings, held to the contrary.49
Thus, when this issue came before the Supreme Court, tradition
and most appellate judges were on the side of the government;
the only case to the contrary had been decided by the narrowest
of margins. The Supreme Court, however, was not indecisive
when it ruled unanimously that prisoners could sue under the Fed-
44 28 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 (1964).
45 Jordan v. Fitzharris, No. 44786, D. Calif. denied Sept. 6, 1966. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, 1343 (1964).
46 The Department of Corrections for California issued regulations six
days later which would prevent the continuation of conditions which
gave rise to this case. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has issued sim-
ilar directives.
4T 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(d); 2671-80 (1964).
48 James v. United States, 280 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 845 (1960); Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958);
Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
49 Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 287, affirming 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.
1962); Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 264, affirming 305 F.2d 253
(2d Cir. 1962).
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eral Tort Claims Act.50 Since then suits have been filed against
the government by prisoners alleging medical malpractice, negli-
gence resulting in injuries, and negligence enabling one prisoner to
assault the plaintiff. About seventy-five or eighty such suits have
been filed since the Supreme Court decision, virtually all requiring
responsive replies. In several cases the prisoners have been able
to obtain judgments. Perhaps the most notable one involves a
vicious assault by an inmate, who was normally kept in segrega-
tion, upon a fellow prisoner, Mickey Cohen, who as a result was
seriously injured. The attacker had escaped from the custody
yard, found his way through the institution grounds, and struck
Cohen on the head with an iron bar. Cohen received a verdict of
some 110,000 dollars. 51 In another case the district court regret-
fully denied recovery after the evidence showed that in view of the
present penal philosophy to permit prisoners as much freedom of
movement within the prison as possible, there was no indication of
negligence.52 A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed in
this case.
There is a provision under federal law to compensate prisoners
who are injured while at work.53  The amount of such an award
is based upon the rates of the Federal Employees Compensation
Act. In addition, all medical expenses relating to the injury are
borne by the federal government.5 4 Several inmates who were
awarded injury compensation nevertheless sued under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. The government took the position that the
compensation is the exclusive remedy available on the theory that
where Congress has authorized a remedy in the nature of work-
men's compensation, that remedy is presumed to be exclusive.55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
this argument and ruled that a prisoner was covered under the
Federal Tort Claims Act even though he was receiving compensa-
tion, essentially because the compensation system was not suf-
ficiently comprehensive.56 On the other hand in an identical situa-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
50 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
51 Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
52 Fleishour v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. l1. 1965), aff'd, 365
F.2d 126 (1966).
53 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
54 28 C.F.R. § 301 (1966).
55 Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959); Johansen v. United
States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
66 Demko v. United States, 350 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1965).
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reached precisely the opposite result.5 7 It is interesting to note
that the Federal Employees Compensation Act,58 which provides
for benefits regardless of fault or contributory negligence, also pre-
cludes suit against the United States.59 A similar conclusion was
reached for the military.60 This issue is to be argued before the
Supreme Court in this term.
During the past session of Congress a bill was introduced which
would bar prisoners from suing under the Tort Claims Act regard-
less of the circumstances.6  This bill is retributive. It is uncon-
scionable to bar a person of his right to seek recovery for injuries
received because of the negligence of others solely because he is
serving a term of imprisonment. Such a repressive law can only
fortify the prisoner's resentment against society. This would be
especially true where the inmate is placed in a situation where he
cannot avoid the circumstances from which the accident resulted.
An example is medical care. The prisoner has no opportunity to
select his own doctor and if he suffers because of the negligence
of the prison physician he should not be without a remedy. Simi-
larly if he is required to expose himself to dangers without proper
safeguards, his keepers should not be immunized from suit. The
one type case which causes concern is the assault by one prisoner
upon another. In the setting of a penal institution there is an in-
ordinately large number of persons with minds bent toward vio-
lence living in close confinement and under unnatural circum-
stances. This results in many assaults within the walls. The only
sure way to protect one inmate from another would be to keep all
inmates locked up and in isolation. This approach, of course, is
indefensible and would cause our correctional systems to revert to
the dark ages. In order to develop programs which are best calcu-
lated to be of assistance to the inmates, it is necessary that a
maximum amount of freedom be allowed. Consequently certain
calculated risks must be taken to achieve this goal, and the gov-
ernment should not be placed in the position of the guarantor of
all inmates' safety. It is true that negligence must still be proven
to warrant recovery; however, the trip to court, with the oppor-
tunity to require prison officials to testify, is payment enough for
some inmates who wish to harass prison officials. Yet, this is
preferable to barring all inmates from suing since there are, of
course, meritorious cases which should be heard.
57 Granade v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1966).
58 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-93 (1964).
59 Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959).
60 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
61 H. R. 16423, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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III. CONCLUSION
Society has seen fit to deprive some 250,000 human beings of
their freedom. The purpose of this brief discussion has been to
promote awareness of the myriad of complex legal and human
problems which shape the lives of these people who live in the
shadows of great gray walls. The balance of rights retained and
restraints imposed upon them will frequently determine whether
their imprisonment will serve or disserve the society that has
judged and bound them.
